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NOTES 
Double Jeopardy and Federal Prosecution After State Jury 
Acquittal 
The fifth amendment's double jeopardy clause prohibits succes-
sive prosecutions of a defendant for the same offense.1 Because this 
seemingly clear prohibition is "not self-defining,"2 a number of in-
terpretive difficulties have arisen. One of the most intracta~le of 
these difficulties concerns the propriety of successive state-federal 
prosecutions3 for identical offenses. When the state proceedings re-
sulted in a conviction4 or a guilty plea5, the Supreme Court has held 
that a subsequent federal prosecution does not offend the double 
jeopardy clause. But the Court has never sanctioned federal re-
prosecution for the same offense after a state jury acquittal.6 The 
I. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No person ... shall ... be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .•.. " Successive prosecutions for the same offense place 
a defendant in double jeopardy once the jury in the second trial is "empaneled and sworn." 
See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 38 (1978); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957); 
Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949). In a bench trial, jeopardy attaches when the court 
begins to hear the evidence. See Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23 (1977). 
2. Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of 
Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. REv. 1001, 1001 (1980). 
3. This Note uses the phrase "state-federal prosecutions" to refer to federal prosecution 
after state trial. Under the dual sovereignty principle, two criminal offenses are deemed to be 
different for double jeopardy purposes when each is defined by a separate sovereign govern-
ment. Although this Note emphasizes the dual sovereignty principle as it applies to federal 
prosecution after state trial, many of the same arguments apply equally to state prosecution 
after federal trial. Questions of dual sovereignty also arise in several other contexts. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has decided that, for double jeopardy purposes, neither municipalities nor 
counties within a single state are separate sovereigns. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977); 
Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970). On the other hand, the federal government and Indian 
tribal governments are separate sovereigns. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (197.8). 
Two separate states are also separate sovereign governments for double jeopardy purposes. 
See Nielsen v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315 (1909). 
4. See, e.g., Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 105 ("[f]he double jeopardy provision 
of the Fifth Amendment does not stand as a bar to federal prosecution though a state convic-
tion based on the same acts has already been obtained."); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 
(1922). 
5. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959). After Abbate pleaded guilty to the 
state offense of conspiracy to destroy another's property, he was tried and convicted in federal 
court for conspiring to destroy "essential and integral parts" of a federally operated communi-
cations system. 359 U.S. at 188-98. 
6. The Supreme Court did permit the State of Illinois to prosecute a defendant who had 
already been acquitted by a federal jury. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959). In Bartkus, 
however, the Court could not base its decision on the double jeopardy clause, since that clause 
was not held to apply to the states until ten years later in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 
(1969). The Bartkus Court upheld the state reprosecution under its fourteenth amendment due 
process analysis, using a standard which prohibited "only those practices 'repugnant to the 
conscience of mankind.'" 359 U.S. at 127 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 
1073 
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possibility of federal prosecution of defendants already acquitted by 
state juries in two highly publicized cases has recently fuele_cJ. the 
controversy.7 After each acquittal, statements by Justice Depart-
ment officials raised expectations that the federal government would 
reprosecute the defendants. 8 
This Note argues that the rationale of the Supreme Court's post-
conviction cases cannot be extended to cases involving jury acquittal 
and that federal reprosecution after state jury acquittal violates the 
double jeopardy clause. One can give meaning to the clause, Part I 
explains, only by reference to its underlying constitutional values. 
Part II suggests that these values, while possibly compatible with 
(1937)). See also Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969) (contrasting "the watered-
down standard enunciated in Palko" with "this Court's interpretations of the Fifth Amend-
ment double jeopardy provision."). 
In all other cases in which the Supreme Court has applied the dual sovereignty principle, 
the first trial resulted in either conviction or a guilty plea. See notes 4-5 supra. While circuit 
courts have squarely addressed the issue whether the dual sovereignty principle applies after 
jury acquittal despite the double jeopardy clause, they have relied only on the dicta in 
Supreme Court dual sovereignty decisions to uphold federal prosecution following state jury 
acquittal See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 516 F.2d 209 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 
859 (1975). But the circuit courts have relied on the Bartkus-Abbate cases to support their 
conclusion that jury acquittal is no different than conviction. See, e.g., United States v. 
Smaldone, 485 F.2d 1333, 1343 (10th Cir. 1973). The problem with relying on Bartkus-Abbate 
for this conclusion is that Abbate concerned federal prosecution after the defendant pleaded · 
guilty in state court; Bartkus, on the other hand, was decided solely upon the Palko due pro-
cess standard. 
7. On May 18, 1980, a Florida criminal court jury acquitted four Miami policemen of the 
fatal beating of Arthur McDuffie, a black insurance executive. Florida had indicted the police-
men for several offenses - murder, manslaughter, aggravated battery, and evidence tamper-
ing. See N.Y. Times, May 19, 1980, § 1, at I, col. 6. According to the prosecutor's evidence, 
the policemen chased McDuffie after he failed to stop for a red light while driving his motorcy-
cle. When the police captured McDuffie, they beat him to death. See N.Y. Times, May 18, 
1980, § I, at 24, col. I. This case captured widespread attention when the verdict sparked 
rioting in Miami. For Miami blacks, the verdict reached by an all-white jury represented final 
"frustration." See N.Y. Times, May 20, 1980, § 2, at 11, col. I. As Attorney General Benja-
min Civiletti said, ''There is a great perception of injustice, which has brought a sense of 
frustration and rage." Id. 
In November 1980, a North Carolina criminal court jury acquitted several Ku Klux Klan 
and Nazi Party members of murdering five Communist Workers Party members. See N.Y. 
Times, Nov. 18, 1980, § I, at I, col. 2. In an editorial, the Washington Post said that the 
verdict would undoubtedly be publicized "as another example of how injustice still reigns in 
the good, old, bigoted USA." Washington Post, Nov. 20, 1980, § I, at 18, col. I. 
8. After the Florida acquittal, Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti arrived in Miami "to 
try to rectify 'whatever injustice has occurred here.'" N.Y. Times, May 20, 1980, § 2, at 11, 
col. I. Civiletti expressed his hope that ''no one feels so outraged and revengeful that they will 
not give the United States Government a chance to investigate the death of Arthur McDuffie." 
Id. After the North Carolina verdict, the Justice Department was "studying the verdict to see 
if there is anything we can do." N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1980, § I, at 1, col. 2. Though the federal 
government has not indicted those defendants already tried by state prosecutors in either case, 
the potential for successive state-federal prosecution remains in these two cases as well as other 
cases. On June 19, 1981, for instance, three blacks under arrest drowned when a boat carrying 
them and three officers capsized. Both the state of Texas and the federal government have the 
opportunity to file charges against the three officers based on this incident, See NEWSWEEK, 
July 20, 1981, at 24. In another recent example, Ernest Lacy, a black man, died while hand-
cuffed in a Milwaukee police paddywagon. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1981, § I, at 26, col. I. 
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federal prosecution after a state conviction, cannot countenance re-
prosecution after a jury acquittal. Part III proposes that courts de-
termine whether such reprosecution is appropriate by applying the 
Blockhurger same offense standard: Two offenses are the same un-
less each requires proof of an element the other does not.9 Provided 
that federal jurisdiction is not the only distinct element in the federal 
offense, this standard accommodates both the federal interest in 
prosecution and the defendant's double jeopardy interests. 
I. THE NEED TO IDENTIFY THE VALUES UNDERLYING THE 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE 
''No person," the fifth amendment guarantees, "shall ... be 
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy ... .''10 
This guarantee, however, is not absolute; the scope of a defendant's 
double jeopardy protection is coextensive with the scope of the defi-
nition of "the same offence." 11 To decide whether the federal gov-
ernment may prosecute a defendant who has been acquitted by a 
state jury, it is thus necessary to determine what constitutes "the 
same offence" in this context. One conception of the phrase is im-
plicit in the principle of dual sovereignty that the Supreme Court has 
applied to federal prosecutions following convictions or guilty pleas 
in state proceedings.12 This principle is grounded in the independent 
powers of the state and federal governments to define and prosecute 
9. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). 
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
11. The "principa1 question" raised in double jeopardy cases involving successive prosecu-
tions is whether the offense charged at the second trial is the "same" as that charged at the first 
trial. See, e.g., Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1980); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 164 
(1977). See generally J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 63-67 (1969); Comment, Twice in Jeop-
ardy, 15 YALE LJ. 262, 267 (1962). 
12. See text at notes 4-5 supra; United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 317 (1978). See 
also Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 158 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). This principle 
originated in several nineteenth century cases in which the Court said that both the state and 
federal governments, as separate sovereigns, had the power to make the same act a criminal 
offense. See Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852); United States v. Marigold, SO U.S. 
(9 How.) 560 (1850); Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (S How.) 410 (1847). Until 1922, the Court had not 
confronted a factual situation where either the federal government sought to prosecute a de-
fendant already tried in state court or a state court sought to prosecute a defendant already 
tried in federal court. But in United States v. Lanz.a, 260 U.S. 377 (1922), the Court held for 
the first time that the federal government could prosecute a defendant convicted in state court. 
The Lanza court, relying on the dicta of the nineteenth century cases, decided that successive 
state-federal prosecutions were permissible since the state and federal governments were sepa-
rate sovereigns, "deriving power from different sources, capable of dealing with the same sub-
ject-matter within the same territory . . . . It follows that an act denounced as a crime by both 
national and state sovereigns is an offense against the peace and dignity of both and may be 
punished by each." 260 U.S. at 382. The Court reaffirmed the dual sovereignty principle in 
two important companion cases decided in the 1959 Term. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 
(1959); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959). See generally L. MILLER, DOUBLE JEOP-
ARDY AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1968). 
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criminal offenses.13 Two criminal offenses, it posits, are not the same 
if each has been proscribed by a separate sovereign government even 
if their elements are identical.14 If courts applied the dual sover-
eignty principle after state jury acquittals, the double jeopardy clause 
would never bar federal reprosecution. 
A very different view of ''the same offence" is implied by the 
'Jury-acquittal rule"15 that governs cases involving a single sover-
eign. The Supreme Court has not used the dual sovereignty princi-
ple to justify federal prosecution after acquittal by a state jury;16 in 
fact, it has repeatedly suggested - in other contexts - that a jury 
verdict of not guilty has "absolute .finality."17 If this rule truly "op-
13. See, eg., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,320 (1978) ("Each [government] has 
the power, inherent in any sovereign, independently to determine what shall be an offense 
against its authority and to punish such offenses •... "); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 
382 (1922) (the federal and state governments represent ''two sovereignties, deriving power 
from different sources, capable of dealing with the same subject-matter within the same terri-
tory. . . ."). But see Note, .Double Prosecution by State and Federal Governments: Another 
Exercise in Federalism, 80 HAR.v. L. REv. 1538, 1542 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Harvard 
Note]; Note, 'I7ze Problems oj' .Double Jeopardy in Successive Federal-State Prosecutions: A 
Fifth Amendment Solution, 31 STAN. L. REv. 477, 486 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Stanford 
Note]. These Notes argue that the Court's conceptual approach to sovereignty is defective as to 
the source of state and federal sovereign power. The Notes suggest that each government 
derives power from the same source, the people. . 
14. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,317 (1978) ("The basis for the [dual sover-
eignty] doctrine is that prosecutions under the laws of separate sovereigns do not, in the lan-
guage of the fifth amendment, 'subject [the defendant] for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy.'"); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 158 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting) (describing the 
principle as "the notion that, somehow, one act becomes two because two jurisdictions are 
involved"). 
IS. See Westen, supra note 2, at 1005. The Court itself has not referred to this rule as the 
'jury-acquittal rule." 
16. See note 6 supra. The Court has confronted double jeopardy cases where the defen• 
dant was retried after jury acquittal. See, eg., Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970); United 
States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896). But it decided those cases based on either a "same offense" 
standard of limited applicability or no such standard at all. Ashe represents the former cate-
gory. The defendant Ashe had been accused of participating in the robbery of six poker play-
ers. At the first trial, prosecution witnesses could not make certain identification of Ashe. As a 
result, the jury acquitted him. Upon retrial, the question of identification was relitigated. The 
Court held that retrial was collaterally estopped. By linking the collateral estoppel doctrine 
with the double jeopardy clause, the Court in effect said that two offenses are the "same" when 
the prosecutor at the second trial tries to prove any issue of fact that the prosecutor at the first 
trial tried but failed to prove. See 391 U.S. at 445-46. But this same offense standard applies 
only when the prosecution relitigates issues actually determined in the defendant's favor at the 
first trial. See 391 U.S. at 442. 
In United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896), the Court held that the defendant could not 
be retried for murder after he had been acquitted of the same charge. The only difference 
between the two offenses was that the second indictment alleged specifically when and where 
the murder took place. See 163 U.S. at 664. But the Court did not develop any general same 
offense standard. 
Similarly, no other cases related to acquittal provide any guidance as to what an appropri-
ate post-acquittal same offense standard should be. See Benton v. Maryland, 395. U.S. 784 
(1969); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957). 
17. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 130 (1980) (quoting Burks v. United 
States, 437 U.S. I, 16 (1978)). Accord, Bullington v. Missouri, 101 S. Ct. 1852, 1861 (1981) 
(holding that the first jury's decision to sentence defendant to life imprisonment constitutes an 
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erates without exception,"18 it would bar all successive state-federal 
prosecutions where the first trial ended in a jury acquittal. The same 
offense standard that inheres in the jury-acquittal rule thus directly 
contradicts the standard implied by the dual sovereignty principle. 
Any resolution of this conflict will likely be influenced by the 
Supreme Court's fear of the ''undesirable consequences"19 that a 
prohibition on successive state-federal prosecutions would engender. 
If a state prosecution absolutely barred federal prosecution for the 
same offense, the state or its agents could, either unwittingly or in-
tentionally, interfere with federal law enforcement.20 Even if the 
state prosecution ended in conviction, the state might punish the de-
fendant less severely than would the federal government.21 
The damage to federal law enforcement could be mitigated in 
several ways, but disadvantages attend each course of action.22 The 
supremacy clause, 23 for example, allows Congress to preempt a state 
law that interferes with federal criminal law.24 But preemption of 
acquittal on the capital murder issue and is "absolutely final"); Burks v. United States, 437 
U.S. I, 16 (1978) (dictum) (''we necessarily afford absolute finality to a jury's verdict of acquit-
tal"); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 439 U.S. 564, 571,(1977). 
18. Westen, supra note 2, at 1004. 
19. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 (1959). 
20. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 (1959); Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 
410 (1847). The federal government has been especially concerned that state prosecution will 
not vindicate federal interests in the area of civil rights. See ·s. REP. No. 721, 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 4, repn'nted in [1968] U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1837, 1840 (''In some places ... 
local officials either have been unable or unwilling to solve and prosecute crimes of racial 
violence or to obtain conviction in such cases - even where the facts seemed to warrant. As a 
result, there is a need for Federal action to compensate for the lack of effective protection and 
prosecution on the local level"); U.S. COMMN. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, LAW ENFORCEMENT: A 
REPORT ON EQUAL PROTECI'ION IN TilE SOUTH 49-53 (1965). This can occur for several rea-
sons. First, state prosecutors may have conducted a less vigorous prosecution than their fed-
eral counterparts. Second, state rules of evidence may differ from the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. Third, state judges may exhibit what federal authorities believe to be excessive 
leniency. See generally Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963) (per curiam) (reversing 
state conviction for contempt that rested on black defendant's refusal to sit in ''the section [of 
the courtroom] reserved for Negroes"); Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally 
Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Avert State Court 
Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 793, 797 (1965). 
21. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 318 (1978); Abbate v. United States, 359 
U.S. 187, 195 (1959). TheAbbate Court specifically emphasized that after the defendant had 
pleaded guilty to the state offense of conspiracy to destroy another's property, he was sen-
tenced to a three month prison sentence. By contrast, the federal punishment for conspiracy to 
destroy federal communications facilities could have been five years' imprisonment. See 359 
U.S. at 195. It does not seem to follow, however, that federal law enforcement in this case 
"must necessarily be hindered." 359 U.S. at 195. Indeed, even if the appropriate measure of 
each government's interest is the length of the sentence, the comparison between the maximum 
federal punishment and the ·actual state punishment is misleading at best. Either both maxi-
mum punishments or both actual punishments should be compared. But see 359 U.S. at 195. 
22. See 359 U.S. at 195. 
23. U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
24. See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (holding that the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2385 (1976) (congressional anticommunist legislation) preempts state sedition act). Congres-
sional intent to preempt state law must be "clear." Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 
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state criminal law "would not be desirable"25 since the states should 
retain the "principal responsibility''26 for criminal law enforce-
ment. 27 As an alte.rnative to federal preemption, state and federal 
officials could devise procedures to coordinate prosecutorial efforts. 
The impracticality of such a scheme, however, has made the Court 
reluctant to require that federal prosecutors "keep informed" of de-
fendants in state court who may be subject to federal prosecution.28 
For cases where state officials obtained a conviction, the Court has 
rejected these proposals29 and has adopted the dual sovereignty prin-
ciple, which always permits federal reprosecution.30 
The Court's determination that the dual sovereignty principle ap-
plies after state conviction does not settle the question whether it 
should also apply after state jury acquittal. "[R]etrials after acquit-
tal," Justice Black once noted, "have been considered particularly 
obnoxious, worse even, in the eyes of many, than retrials after con-
viction."31 It may seem paradoxical that the outcome of a trial -
conviction or jury acquittal - could affect the application of the 
dual sovereignty principle and, in turn, the same offense standard.32 
218, 230 (1947). The Court presumes congressional intent to preempt in three cases: first, 
when state law "may produce a result inconsistent with the objective of the federal statute," 
Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); second, when there is a predomi-
nant federal interest in a particular area, see Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504 (1956); 
and third, where the "scheme of federal regulation [is] so pervasive as to make reasonable the 
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it," Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator 
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
25. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 318 (1978). 
26. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 (1959). See also Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 
121, 137 (1959); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 109 (1945); Jerome v. United States, 318 
U.S. 101, 104-05 (1943). 
21. See Address by Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti to the North Carolina State 
Bar Association (Oct. 17, 1980). 
28. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 (1959). See Westen, supra note 2, at 1037 
n.121. Despite these repeated assertions about the impracticality of coordinating prosecutions, 
this theory has never been tested. Indeed, in the recent Florida trial of the four policemen, 
federal prosecutors did "keep informed" about the progress of the trial. They simply expected 
the trial to produce some convictions. See N.Y. Times, May 20, 1980, § 2, at 11, col. 1. 
29. Walter Fisher, Bartkus' attorney in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959), argues for 
limited preemption of state criminal law. See Fisher, JJoub/e Jeopardy and Federalism, SO 
MINN. L. REv. 607 (1966), Fisher suggests that Congress should bar state prosecution if a state 
defendant elects a federal trial and the federal prosecutors agree to prosecute. Federal trial, in 
Fisher's proposal, is not barred even if federal prosecutors at first decline to prosecute. See Id. 
at 610-11. This proposal leaves unanswered the question whether a defendant's double jeop-
ardy protection under the fifth amendment bars any federal trial after state prosecution. If it 
docs, then Fisher's proposed statute would be unconstitutional. 
30. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 138 
(1959), argued that "[t]he greatest self-restraint is necessary when that federal system yields 
results with which a court is in little sympathy." He meant that the dual sovereignty principle, 
though finally accepted, was not totally desirable. He thus expressed the Court's hope that the 
states would restrain themselves from prosecuting defendants already tried in federal court. 
See 359 U.S. at 138-39 (commending several states that statutorily barred such prosecutions). 
31. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 162 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). 
32. This Note restricts its analysis to successive prosecutions where the first trial is a jury 
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But' if previously acquitted defendants have greater double jeopardy 
interests than their convicted counterparts, courts arguably should 
develop a same offense standard that affords them additional protec-
tion. The validity of this tentative conclusion can be tested by using 
four traditional aids to constitutional interpretation.33 Unfortu-
nately, three of these aids - the constitutional text, the framers' in-
tent, and precedent - provide few clues as to the level of protection 
that defendants who have been acquitted in state jury trials deserve. 
As a result, the fourth - the values or purposes underlying the 
double jeopardy clause - must provide the framework for defining 
"the same offence" after state jury acquittal. 
Although the language of the fifth amendment furnishes a start-
ing point, it does not indicate how ''the same offence" should be de-
fined. 34 "[T]he meaning of this phrase," the Supreme Court has 
observed, "may vary from context to context . . . ."35 Nothing in the 
amendment's language, therefore, is inconsistent with the tentative 
conclusion regarding the greater protection to be accorded acquitted 
defendants. 
The utility of tying constitutional interpretation to the framers' 
original intentions has been seriously questioned, 36 but that debate 
should not detain an analysis of the double jeopardy clause because 
the framers said little that is helpful about the meaning of "the same 
offence." They believed that the phrase meant precisely the same 
offense. In their view, two offenses were the same only when the 
elements of the crimes were identical.37 The Supreme Court has ex-
plicitly rejected this approach; its cases make clear that two offenses 
need not be identical to be considered the "same" for double jeop-
ardy purposes.38 Since the framers' statements on the scope of 
trial Bench trial is not discussed because, for double jeopardy purposes, bench acquittal dif-
fers substantially from jury acquittal. While bench acquittal raises the double jeopardy value 
of finality, jury acquittal alone implicates the value of jury nullification. See Part II iefra. The 
Court has recently denied certiorari in two double jeopardy cases where the first trial resulted 
in bench acquittal. See Cecil v. United States, 444 U.S. 881 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari) (after judge acquitted defendant of possession of cocaine with intent 
to distribute, prosecutors charged defendant with distribution of cocaine as well as po~ession 
of cocaine with intent to distribute); Cousins v. Maryland, 429 U.S. 1027 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing), denying cert. to 277 Md. 383, 354 A.2d 825 (1976). 
33. See Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1033, 1037, 1061 (1981); 
Westen, supra note 2, at 1001-04. 
34. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684 (1980); Westen, supra note 2, at 1001. 
35. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 700 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing 
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166-67 n.6 (1977)). 
36. See Sandalow, supra note 33. 
37. The framers relied on both Blackstone and Coke. See J. SIGLER, supra note 11, at 16. 
Blackstone had said that double jeopardy occurred only. when a defendant was tried twice "for 
the same identical act and crime." 4 w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *336. Until the nine-
teenth century, the double jeopardy bar prohibited retrial only "for precisely the same of-
fence." M. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 14 (1969) (emphasis in original). 
38. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 164 (1977). Indeed, double jeopardy questions about 
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double jeopardy protection were based on a fundamentally different 
conception of what constitutes "the same offence," the task of defin-
ing the phrase devolves to the two final sources of constitutional 
interpretation. 
Y ef precedent, the third aid, is not decisive. The Court has never 
confronted the question whether the dual sovereignty principle 
should apply when the first trial ended injury acquittal.39 Whenever 
the Court has been prepared to consider this question, federal prose-
cutors, following established Justice Department policy,40 have re-
quested dismissal of the federal charges.41 The Court's statements in 
double jeopardy cases, moreover, support two inconsistent conclu-
sions. Some of its language suggests that the clause permits succes-
sive state-federal prosecutions however the first trial ended.42 But 
other language hints that an acquittal affords greater double jeop-
ardy protection than a conviction43 and that "a jury's verdict of ac-
quittal" is absolutely final.44 The meaning of ''the same offence" 
after jury acquittal, therefore, may differ from the meaning of the 
phrase after conviction.45 
In the absence of decisive precedent, only the values underlying 
the double jeopardy clause can support a conclusion that state jury 
acquittal differs sufficiently from conviction to justify a broader, 
identical offenses are rare today. Because of the proliferation of statutorily defined crimes, 
litigation often centers instead on whether two or more statutes proscribe what appears to be 
the same act. See Comment, supra note 11, at 268-69. 
39. See note 6 supra. 
40. Soon after the Bartkus-Abbate decisions, the Justice Department adopted a policy that 
there should be no federal prosecution after state trial unless "reasons are compelling." N.Y. 
Times, Apr. 6, 1959, § I, at I, col 4. The Department continues to adhere to that policy. See, 
e.g., Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22 (1977) (per curiam). See also Petite v. United States, 
361. U.S. 529 (1960) (per curiam) (first decision accepting the Department's policy, later known 
as the Petite policy). 
41. See Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22 (1977) (per curiam); Watts v. United States, 
422 U.S. 1032 (1975); Marakar v. United States, 370 U.S. 723, vacating per curiam 300F.2d513 
(3d Cir. 1962); Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960) (per curiam). 
42. The Court has stated that "a state prosecution does not bar a federal one." United 
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,317 (1978) (permitting federal prosecution ofa Navajo Indian 
who previously pleaded guilty in a Tribal Court). The Abbate Court did not view the dual 
sovereignty principle as broadly, stating only that "Lanza has been considered in many cases 
in the Courts of Appeals to have established the general principle that a federal prosecution is 
not barred by a prior state prosecution of the same person for the same acts." Abbate v. 
United States, 359 U.S. 187, 194 (1959). 
43. See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980) ("An acquittal is accorded 
special weight."); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978) (an acquittal has "particular 
significance"); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978) (double jeopardy clause "con-
clusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair'' after acquittal); Fong Foo v. United 
States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (per curiam). 
44. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. I, 16 (1978) (emphasis in original). For other cases, 
see note 17 supra. 
45. See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 700 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Wes• 
ten, supra note 2, at 1004. 
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more protective same offense standard. Professor Westen has persua-
sively demonstrated that "the double jeopardy clause is a triptych of 
three separate values."46 The first concerns the defendant's interest 
in repose and finality. This value, which lies at the ''heart"47 of the 
clause, safeguards a defendant from the "ordeal" of a second crimi-
nal prosecution for ''the same offence." The second value concerns 
the preservation of the defendant's interest in criminal jury nullifica-
tion. The "absolute finality'' of jury acquittals springs from the 
criminal jury's prerogative to nullify the law by acquitting a defend-
ant "against the evidence."48 The third value concerns the double 
jeopardy rule that the government cannot punish a defendant twice 
for "the same offence."49 The value that informs this rule is the de-
fendant's interest in the ''lawful administration of prescribed 
sentences."50 This means that a defendant cannot be punished be-
yond the maximum penalty authorized by the legislature for the 
criminal offense that he has committed.51 
These three "entirely distinct . . . and theoretically indepen-
dent"52 values explain the existence of double jeopardy protection. 
If these values mandate dissimilar treatment for convicted defend-
ants and those previously acquitted by a jury, that difference in treat-
ment should be reflected in the same offense standard applied to 
each class of defendant. Only after assessing the double jeopardy 
values implicated in each situation, therefore, can one establish an 
appropriate same offense standard for federal prosecution after state 
jury acquittal. 
II. THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY VALUES IMPLICATED BY CONVICTION 
,AND JURY ACQUITTAL 
Because the Supreme Court has held that the double jeopardy 
clause does not prohibit federal prosecution after a state conviction, 
the argument that the clause limits federal prosecution after a state 
jury acquittal must rest on a palpable distinction between conviction 
and jury acquittal. As Part I indicated, such a distinction can be 
found only in the clause's values or purposes. Two values underlie 
double jeopardy protection against postconviction retrial - finality 
and the prohibition against multiple punishment for a single offense. 
46. See Westen, supra note 2, at 1002. 
47. Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 150 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
48. See Westen, supra note 2, at 1012-23. 
49. The Court adopted this rule in Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 168 (1873). 
50. Westen, supra note 2, at 1002. 
51. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 718 (1969) (describing an example of 
multiple punishment where defendant serves "separate prison terms of three and 10 years, 
although the maximum single punishment for the offense is 10 years imprisonment"). 
52. Westen, supra note 2, at 1002. 
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Retrial after jury acquittal also implicates two double jeopardy val-
ues - finality and jury nullification. This Part evaluates these val-
ues and argues that double jeopardy protection is significantly 
broader after jury acquittal than after conviction. This, in tum, ex-
plains why the same offense standard should afford greater protec-
tion to a defendant's interests after state jury acquittal. 
A. The Interest in Finality 
After a defendant has been tried, he has an interest in ending the 
"ordeal" of criminal prosecution;53 to the extent that the ordeal of 
retrial is undue, the double jeopardy clause protects this interest. 
Courts effectuate the finality value by balancing the defendant's in-
terest in repose against the public's interest in effective law enforce-
ment.54 Thus, a defendant's interest in ending the "embarrassment, 
expense and . . . anxiety''55 of criminal prosecution is weighed 
against the government's interest in ensuring conviction of the 
guilty.56 
Implicit in the Supreme Court's double jeopardy decisions are 
two criteria that point to an appropriate balance between these inter-
ests after a state trial. 57 First, a defendant should be able to prepare 
a defense with the expt?ctation that he can concentrate his efforts at a 
single trial. If a defendant fears the possibility of a second prosecu-
tion, he may be forced to conserve resources, thus reducing his abil-
ity to defend. 58 Second, the federal government should not be 
53. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957). See Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 
216-18 (1978); Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323,331 (1970); United States v. Kuck, 573 F.2d 25, 
27 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Beckerman, 516 F.2d 905, 906 (2d Cir. 1975); United 
States a rel Russo v. Superior Court of NJ., 483 F.2d 7, 12 (3d Cir.), cerl. denied, 414 U.S. 
1023 (1973). 
54. This balancing method is derived from mistrial cases, which "present in pure form 
what is often taken to be the central value of double jeopardy, viz., the defendant's interest in 
getting the proceedings over with once and for all." Westen & Drubel, Toward a General The-
ory of OoubleJeopardy, 1978 SUP. CT. REv. 81, 85. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 
(1978) (balancing the defendant's interest in .finality against the public interest in prosecution 
when mistrial declared upon motion by the prosecutor or the court); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 
U.S. 458, 471 (1973) (''the defendant's interest in proceeding to verdict is outweighed by the 
competing and equally legitimate demand for public justice"); Finch v. United States, 433 U.S. 
676, 680 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing precedent which "emphasized more of a 
balancing and fairness test"). See also Westen, supra note 2, at 1036. 
55. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957). 
56. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. I, 15 (1978). See generally Westen, supra note 2, 
at 1036. 
57. Professor Westen argues that no double jeopardy problems of .finality can be resolved 
unless the appropriate criteria of .finality _are de.fined. See Westen, supra note 2, at 1038-40. 
58. This criterion proceeds from the assumptions that the adversary relationship between 
government and individual is uneven from the beginning and that the individual has scarce 
resources for his defense. In mistrial cases, the double jeopardy clause permits retrial only 
when required by "manifest necessity." See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 480 (1971) 
(quoting United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824)); Downum v. United 
States, 372 U.S. 734, 738 n.1 (1963) (quoting United States v. Watson, 28 F. Cas. 499, 500 
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permitted to use the state trial solely "to strengthen its case" by dis-
covering the defendant's evidence or by correcting possible deficien-
cies in its own case.59 The government can muster resources that 
dwarf those of the defendant, and retrial compounds this imbal-
ance. 60 A defendant facing successive state-federal prosecutions, 
moreover, is in an adversarial relationship with, not one, but two 
governments possessing resources far superior to those available for 
his defense.61 
These two prerequisites to fairness apply to all state-federal pros-
ecutions, regardless of the outcome of the state trial. But they carry 
greater weight after acquittal than after conviction because retrial 
following acquittal creates "an unacceptably high risk" that an inno-
cent defendant will be convicted.62 All things considered (assuming 
adequate resources, effective assistance of counsel, and constitutional 
trial procedures), a defendant who has previously been found guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt is more likely to be actually guilty than a 
defendant who was acquitted in his first trial. Retrial of a previously 
acquitted defendant who has expended all of his resources preparing 
and presenting a successful defense thus increases the likelihood that 
federal prosecutors will obtain a conviction against an innocent de-
fendant. If sufficient evidence existed to convince the state judge or 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty, more-
over, it is less likely that the federal prosecutors needed to use the 
state case to further their discovery or otherwise aid their case. All 
(S.D.N.Y. 1868)). "Manifest necessity" is taken to mean that the government bears a special 
burden of justifying retrial. See Westen & Drube}, supra note 54, at 91 n.58. 
59. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458,469 (1973) (retrial not barred because it was mani-
festly necessary). The Court indicated that retrial is permissible in some cases, even though 
the retrial enables the government to strengthen its case. In Somerville, the Court permitted 
retrial because "delay was minimal" and mistrial was "the only way" to correct a defective 
indictment. 410 U.S. at 469. This suggests that, although any retrial presents the prosecution 
with the opportunity to strengthen its case, retrial will be permitted when there is "no sugges-
tion that the implementation of that policy . . . could be manipulated so as to prejudice the 
defendant" 410 U.S. at 469. Cf. Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 216 (1978) (trial de novo after 
master's hearing did not violate double jeopardy clause because both were part of a "single 
proceeding"). But cf. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978) (retrial improper where 
appellate court reverses conviction because of inadequacy of the evidence). 
60. See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. H7, 130 (1980). 
61. A third criterion concerns prosecutorial harassment. A prosecutor should not harass a 
defendant by subjecting him to repeated prosecution without justification, since prosecutorial 
misconduct aggravates a defendant's "anxiety and insecurity." Green v. United States, 355 
U.S. 184, 187 (1957). Harassment, for double jeopardy purposes, necessarily involves 
prosecutorial misconduct. Prosecutorial misconduct occurs when the prosecutor reprosecutes 
"without legitimate justification." See Comment, supra note 11, at 288. But Justice Depart-
ment policy requires legitimate justification because federal prosecutors forego federal prose-
cution after state trial unless there are compelling reasons supporting federal prosecution. See 
Dept. of Justice Press Release (Apr. 6, 1959); N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1959, § 1, at 19, col. 2. For 
cases dismissed at the request of the Justice Department, see note 41 supra. 
62. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 130 (1980). See Swisher v. Brady, 438 
U.S. 204, 216 (1978); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 504 (1978); Green v. United States, 
355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). 
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of this suggests that a defendant's interest in finality should be val-
ued more highly if he were acquitted in the prior state proceeding 
rather than convicted. 
B. Jury Nullification and the Prohibition Against Multiple 
Punishment 
The remaining two double jeopardy values are outcome-specific: 
The interest in jury nullification arises only after jury acquittal, 
while the interest in avoiding greater punishment than the legislature 
intended arises only after conviction. The importance of these val-
ues is not fixed, but varies with the context in which they are impli-
cated. This Section demonstrates that the prohibition against 
multiple punishment affords defendants less double jeopardy protec-
tion than does the need to protect the jury's prerogative to acquit 
against the evidence. 63 
I. Multiple Punishment 
The double jeopardy clause prohibits courts from punishing a de-
fendant twice for the same offense. Double punishment occurs when 
a defendant's sentence exceeds the maximum penalty that the legis-
lature intended to impose for his crime.64 To determine whether cu-
mulative state and federal sentences constitute single or double 
punishment, courts must first ascertain what Congress intended. 
The effect of the double jeopardy clause on this analysis of Con-
gress' intent is unsettled.65 It is unlikely that the clause provides an 
independent standard limiting the penalties that can be imposed for 
specific offenses.66 But it may create "a presumption against finding 
that domestic law intends multiple offenses and multiple punish-
ment, a presumption that can be overcome only by 'clear and unmis-
takable' evidence that the domestic law intends offenses and 
sentences to be cumulated."67 The Supreme Court has used the pre-
sumption approach where a defendant was convicted and punished 
in a single trial under two separate statutory provisions enacted by 
Congress. It justified the presumption on the ground that "Congress 
63. There is no reason to believe that the combined effect of the two weaker postconviclion 
values somehow outweighs the combined effect of the two stronger jury acquittal values. 
64. See, e.g., Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684 (1980) (defendant unconstitutionally 
sentenced at a single trial to consecutive terms for rape and for killing the same victim in the 
course of the rape); Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975); North Carolina v. Pearce, 
395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958); Ex Parle Lange, 85 U.S. 
(18 Wall.) 163 (1873) (originated double punishment rule). 
65. See text at notes 66-73 supra. 
66. See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 697 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring); 
Westen, supra note 2, at 1024-25. 
67. Westen, supra note 2, at 1026 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). See Whalen 
v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 692 (1980). 
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ordinarily does not intend to punish the same offense under two dif-
ferent statutes."68 It is not clear, however, that the case for the pre-
sumption is as strong when both the federal and state governments 
prohibit and penalize certain conduct. 
Even if the presumption is applied against successive state-fed-
eral prosecution, it will not have much effect, for there is sufficient 
evidence both to rebut a strong presumption against double punish-
ment and to establish affirmatively that Congress did intend cumula-
tive sentences. The legislative history reveals that Congress enacted 
several statutes because some criminal defendants were not "appro-
priately punished by local courts."69 Yet the record also displays 
Congress's preference for concurrent, not exclusive, jurisdiction.70 
Only a handful of sections of the federal criminal code explicitly 
provide that state conviction or acquittal bars subsequent federal 
prosecution.71 As for the rest of the code, the legislative record 
shows, although often not explicitly, Congress' intent to permit con-
68 .. Whalen v. United States; 445 U.S. 684, 692 (1980). The Court also applied the high 
standard of "clear and unmistakable" evidence. 
69. S. REP. No. 721, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in [1968) U.S. CODE CONG. & An. 
NEWS 1837, 1840 ("In some places, however, local officials either have been unable or unwill-
ing to solve and prosecute crimes of racial violence or to obtain convictions in such cases 
. . . ."). The problem of inadequate state punishment was especially true for ''racial crimes." 
Id., [1968) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1839. In response to this problem, Congress 
enacted several statutes that prescribe punishment for civil rights offenses. See 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 241,242, 245(b) (1976). The federal penalties for these offenses range "from misdemeanor 
penalties when no one is harmed to $10,000 fines and 10 years' imprisonment when there is 
physical injury, and life imprisonment when death occurs." S. REP. No. 721, 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 6, reprinted in [1968) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1837, 1841. 
70. Congress enacted the civil rights offenses ''to compensate for the lack of effective pro-
tection and prosecution on the local level" See S. REP. No. 721, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, re-
printed in [1968) U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS. 1837, 1840. The Senate Report did ·not 
suggest that such compensation should amount to displacement of state prosecutions and pun-
ishments. According to the Senate Minority views, federal enforcement authorities should still 
defer to the states. See id. at 14, [1968) U.S. CooE CoNG. & AD. NEWS at 1847-48. 
Outside the civil rights area, Congress has stated its intent regarding concurrent jurisdic-
tion. See, e.g., Arson-far-Profit: Its Impact on States and Localities: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th 
Cong, 1st Sess. (1977). For other examples of Congress' intent, see notes 71-72 infra. 
71. See 18 U.S.C. § 659 (1976) (interstate or foreign shipments by carrier) ("A judgment of 
conviction or acquittal on the merits under the laws of any State shall be a bar to any prosecu-
tion under this section for the same act or acts."); 18 U.S.C. § 660 (1976) (carrier's funds de-
rived from commerce); 18 U.S.C. § 1992 (1976) (wrecking trains); 18 U.S.C. § 210l(c) (1976) 
(riots); 18 U.S.C. § 2117 (1976) (breaking or entering carrier facilities). 
Principles of statutory construction suggest that the inclusion of a statement barring succes-
sive state-federal punishment in these five sections indicates an intent to permit such punish-
ment in the remaining sections. See 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION§ 53.01 (4th ed. C. Sands ed. 1972). The counterargument is that this concerns 
a penal statute, and penal statutes should be strictly construed. See id. at § 59.01. Where pun-
ishment relies on questionable intent, the "rule of lenity" governs criminal punishment. See 
Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 391 (1958). This rule suggests that doubts about double 
punishment should be resolved in the defendant's favor. But this principle of strict construc-
tion should not defeat Congress' actual intent if it can be dedu~d from the statutes and the 
record. 
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secutive sentences. 72 Evidence like this has led the Supreme Court 
to presume congressional intent to permit federal punishment in ad-
dition to state punishment.73 Congress' intent, in short, does not 
limit the application of the dual sovereignty principle after state con-
viction, and successive state-federal prosecution does not undermine 
the double punishment value. 
2. Jury Nu!ltftcation 
Jury nullification is based on a view of the criminal jury as an 
institution that provides a buffer between the government - legisla-
ture, prosecutor, and judge - and the defendant.74 A criminal jury, 
of course, may acquit a defendant based on its findings of fact. 
When this occurs, the jury applies the law prescribed by the legisla-
ture. But when a criminal jury acquits a defendant against the evi-
72. In a recent House Report on District of Columbia Court Reform, the Committee on 
the District of Columbia conceded that Congress often fails to specify explicitly its intent to 
permit consecutive sentences for criminal offenses based on the same conduct. See H.R. REP. 
No. 907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 113 (1970). But the Committee spoke approvingly of the usual 
judicial interpretation of Congress's intention to impose consecutive sentences when each of-
fense requires proof of a fact that the other does not. Id. (endorsing Blockburger rule that 
permits consecutive sentences as reflecting congressional intent). By contrast, the Committee 
disapproved of recent decisions by the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals that 
denied consecutive sentences derived from separate provisions. See, e.g., Smith v. United 
States, 418 F.2d 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Most importantly, the Committee explained the intent 
underlying separate criminal provisions. In particular, it suggested that, if offenses are defined 
by "separate, independent provisions oflaw," then sentences for such offenses can be imposed 
consecutively. H.R. REP. No. 907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 114 (1970). 
Indeed, a review of the federal criminal code fails to reveal any shred of evidence sug-
gesting that Congress intended to bar successive state-federal prosecutions, aside from the five 
sections where that bar was mentioned specifically. See note 71 supra. Nothing suggests that 
state and federal penalties cannot cumulate so long as the combined sentence falls within the 
maximum federal sentence. Congress simply prescribes maximum penalties for the federal 
criminal offenses. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 873 (1976) (blackmail defendant "shall be fined not 
more than $2000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both"); 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976) 
(defendant convicted of fraud "shall be fined not more that $10,000 or imprisoned not more 
than five years, or both"); 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1976) (defendant convicted of bank robbery 
"[s]hall be fined not more than $5000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both"). 
See also 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1976) (credit for time in custody prior to imposition of sentence); 18 
U.S.C. § 3617 (1976) (fines and penalties). 
73. The Court presumes that federal law enforcement "must necessarily be hindered" if a 
state conviction bars subsequent punishment. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 
(1959). In general, the federal courts permit federal sentences to cumulate with state sentences, 
See United States v. Myers, 451 F.2d 402, 404 (9th Cir. 1972) (federal district judge cannot 
require, but only recommend, that federal sentence run concurrently with state sentence); 
Hardy v. United States Bd. of Parole, 443 F.2d 402, 402 (9th Cir. 1971) (defendant is not 
entitled to credit on federal sentence for time served on state sentence); Green v. United States, 
334 F.2d 733, 736 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 980 (1965) (federal sentence can begin 
when state sentence is completed). 
14. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 229 (1978); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 
(1970) ("the essential feature of a jury obviously lies in the interposition between the accused 
and his accuser of the common sense judgment of a group of laymen"); Duncan v. Louisiana, 
391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) ("Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers 
gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or over-zealous prosecutor and against 
the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge."). 
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dence, it nullifies the law. In such cases, the jury rejects the 
legislature's standard of criminal conduct, perhaps implicitly, by 
finding the defendant not guilty under its own more lenient stan-
dard.75 By nullifying what it perceives to be an unjust law or an 
unjust application of a just law, the jury plays a special role in the 
criminal process. 
Although commentators have debated the question whether the 
criminal jury has legitimate authority to nullify the law,76 the 
Supreme Court has recognized its power to do so.77 The Court's 
view is supported by the considerable differences between the sixth 
amendment criminal jury and the seventh amendment civil jury. In 
a civil case, a judge may direct a verdict against the defendant,78 
enter judgment n.o.v.,79 or order a new trial if the jury returns an 
inconsistent verdict.80 These jury-control devices are conspicuously 
absent in criminal cases;81 the criminal jury cannot be restricted to its 
fact-finding role. 82 And the prosecutor in a criminal case cannot ap-
peal a jury acquittal "even if the evidence of guilt is overwhelm-
ing."83 A defendant's interest in jury trial is guaranteed by the sixth 
15. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 640 (1980) (juries "create their own sentencing 
discretion"). See generally M. KADISH & s. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY 50-72 (1973); 
Westen, supra note 2, at 1012-18. Just as the chief executive has authority to pardon, so, too, 
does the jury have the prerogative to nullify the law set down by legislature. See Westen & 
Drubel, supra note 54, at 130 n.230. 
16. See Schellin & Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1980, at 51, 85-110. Compare Schellin, Jury. Nullification: The 
Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. RE.v. 168 (1972) (supporting jury nullification) with Simson, 
Jury Nullification in the American System: A Skeptical View, 54 TEXAS L. RE.v. 488 (1976) 
(questioning jury nullification). See also Westen, supra note 2, at 1012-23. 
11. See Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 22 (1980) (per Burger, C.J.) (criminal 
juries can "acquit out of compassion or compromise"); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,317 
n.10 (1979) (''the factfinder in a criminal case has traditionally been permitted to enter an 
unassailable but unreasonable verdict of 'not guilty.'"). 
78. See FED. R. CIV. P. SO(a). 
19. See FED. R. CIV. P. SO(b). 
80. See FED. R. CIV. P. 59. 
81. Under FED. R. CRIM. P. 29, the defendant can move for judgment of acquittal. But no 
rule allows the prosecutor to move for judgment of conviction. See United States v. Bene-
detto, 558 F.2d 171, 176-77 (3d Cir. 1977) (prejudicial error to direct jury to assume fact 
favorable to the prosecution); United States v. Burnett, 476 F.2d 726, 728-29 (5th Cir. 1973) 
(alternative holding) (prejudical error in jury instruction because it amounted to directing a 
verdict of guilty). As for motions for a new trial, the defendant can make such a motion under 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 33. There is no similar provision enabling the prosecution to move for a new 
trial. 
82. See Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 22 (1980) (''The absence of these remedial 
procedures in criminal cases permits juries to acquit out of compassion or compromise 
.... "). 
83. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317 n.10 (1979). Congress permits prosecutorial 
appeal in some cases. For instance, federal prosecutors can appeal from "a decision arresting a 
judgment of conviction for insufficiency of the indictment .... " 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976). 
But Congress nowhere provides for appeal from judgment entered on a jury verdict of acquit-
tal. The courts generally prohibit government appeal from either bench acquittal or jury ac-
quittal. See Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 75 (1978); United States v. Altamirano, 
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amendment. 84 
To protect this interest, the Supreme Court has developed the 
jury acquittal rule, which accepts jury acquittals, "no matter how 
erroneous," as :final.85 The rule prohibits retrial because prosecuting 
a defendant twice for the same offense would greatly dilute the jury's 
prerogative to nullify the law. Although the Court has applied the 
jury acquittal rule only to reprosecution by the same sovereign, the 
reasoning that underlies the rule appears to apply as well to federal 
prosecution following a state jury acquittal. 
This conclusion, however, should not be accepted too hastily. To 
argue that federal reprosecution undermines a defendant's interest in 
jury nullification, one must first define the scope of that interest. A 
defendant, one could argue, has no interest in state jury nullification 
of federal law. While his interest in state jury nullification of state 
law is absolute, the argument would run, state juries cannot nullify 
federal law. And because the federal government could have prose-
cuted and punished the defendant even if he had been convicted in 
the state trial, 86 federal prosecution after a state jury acquittal does 
not, at least in theory, deprive him of the benefit of jury nullification 
of state law. 
These arguments miss the central point. The interest threatened 
by federal prosecution of a previously acquitted defendant is an in-
terest in nullification of state law, not an interest in state jury nullifi-
cation of federal law. Federal reprosecution, moreover, poses a real 
threat to this interest. AlthoughAbbate sanctioned federal prosecu-
tion of a defendant previously convicted in a state court, 87 the Court 
has warned that "[t]he greatest self-restraint is necessary" in exercis-
ing the power to reprosecute.88 In response to the Court's concern 
over potential abuses of a rule that permits double prosecution, the 
Justice Department established what has become known as the "Pe-
633 F.2d 147, 151 n.2 (9th Cir. 1980). But some federal courts have permitted the government 
to appeal a judgment of acquittal where the jury previously entered a verdict of guilty. See 
United States v. Clemones, 577 F.2d 1247, 1255 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 
(1980); United States v. Donahue, 539 F.2d 1131, 1134 (8th Cir. 1976). Permitting government 
appeal in these cases ~ghlights the significance of the jury verdict. Put another way, jury 
acquittal, not bench acquittal, operates to prohibit completely government appeal. 
84. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . ."). 
85. See Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430,445 (1981); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 
U.S. 117, 130n.ll (1980); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. I, 16 (1978); Arizona v. Washington, 
434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977); 
Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (per curiam). 
86. See text at notes 4-5 supra. 
87. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); see Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 
(1959). 
88. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 138 (1959); see Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 
201-04 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting); Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 163 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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tile policy'':89 "After a state prosecution there should be no Federal 
trial for the same act or acts unless the reasons are compelling."90 
This policy, while not creating substantive rights for defend-
ants,91 demonstrates that federal prosecution after a state jury ac-
quittal actually undermines a defendant's interest in nullification. It 
establishes a loose partnership or community of interest between 
state and federal prosecutors and ensures that "consideration of a 
second prosecution very seldom should arise."92 The Justice Depart-
ment's guidelines are open-ended, but its examples of "compelling" 
reasons for federal reprosecution seem to apply mainly after acquit-
tal.93 For convicted defendants, the theoretically possible federal re-
prosecution is unlikely to mat~rialize. If the threat of double 
prosecution becomes real only after state acquittal, it seems clear 
that reprosecution may deprive defendants of the benefit of jury nul-
lification. The Justice Department guidelines, in fact, list state jury 
nullification itself as a "compelling" reason for federal 
reprosecution.94 
This jury nullification value and the stronger post-acquittal final-
ity interest provide a basis for distinguishing between convicted and 
acquitted defendants and according greater double jeopardy protec-
tion after state jury acquittal than after state conviction. The prohi-
bition against multiple punishment creates, at best, a presumption 
against successive state-federal prosecution- a presumption that is 
89. The name comes from Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960). 
90. N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1959, § 1, at 19, cot 2 (text of Attorney General William P. Rog-
ers' memorandum to federal attorneys). The current version of the Petite policy is spelled out 
in the U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATIORNEYS' MANUAL, Tit. 9, § 2.142, at 20 
(rev. Jan. 3, 1980) [hereinafter cited as U.S. ArroRNEYs' MANUAL]: 
The Department of Justice's dual prosecution policy precludes the initiation or continua-
tion of a federal prosecution following a state prosecution based on substantially the same 
act or acts unless there is a compelling federal interest supporting the dual prosecutorial 
discretion in order to promote efficient utilization of the Department's resources and to 
protect persons charged with criminal conduct from the unfairness associated with multi-
ple prosecutions and multiple punishments for substantially the same act or acts. 
91. See Annot, 51 A.L.R. FED. 852,856 (1981); Stanford Note, supra note 13, at 488-94. 
But see United States v. Thompson, 579 F.2d 1184, 1189 (10th Cir. 1978) (dissenting opinion). 
92. N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1959, § 1, at 19, cot 4 (text of Attorney General William P. Rog-
ers' memorandum to federal attorneys). 
93. See U.S. ArroRNEYs' MANuAL, supra note 90, at 20. The Manual states that "if the 
state proceeding resulted in a conviction - [dual prosecution] normally will not be authorized 
unless an enhanced sentence in the federal prosecution is anticipated." The Manual goes on to 
list factors which may compel federal prosecution: 
(1) infection of the state proceeding by incompetence, corruption, intimidation, or undue 
influence; (2) court or jury nullification involving an important federal interest, in blatant 
disregard of the evidence; (3) the failure of the state to prove an element of the state 
offense which is not an clement of the federal offense; or (4) the unavailability of signifi-
cant evidence in the state proceeding either because it was not timely discovered or be-
cause it was suppressed on state law grounds or on an erroneous view of the federal law. 
Id. at 20c. See generally U.S. DE.PT. OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION 11-13 
(1980). 
94. See U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANuAL, supra note 90, at 20c. 
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rebutted in the legislative history of the federal criminal code. The 
jury nullification interest, by contrast, provides a strong reason to 
limit federal reprosecution since the second trial could undercut the 
first jury's prerogative to acquit against the evidence. 
III. DEFINING ''THE SAME OFFENCE" AFTER STATE JURY 
ACQUITTAL 
Despite the differences between conviction and jury acquittal, it 
does not necessarily follow that state jury acquittals should always 
bar subsequent federal prosecutions. A same offense standard that 
preserves the jury nullification value must also be consistent with the 
federal interest in reprosecution.95 It is difficult, however, to devise a 
standard that balances these interests, in large part because we do 
not understand why criminal juries acquit against the evidence. To 
begin ·with, we do not know precisely when a jury has nullified the 
law because the rationale for nullification changes with each case.96 
In the usual case, jury nullification appears to be based on the senti-
mental appeal of the defendant's predicament.97 But a court will be 
unable to discover whether the verdict resulted from defective fact-
finding or whether the jury acquitted against the evidence. The deci-
sion-making process of a criminal jury is hidden by the general ver-
dict that it returns,98 and investigation of the jury to determine how 
it reached its verdict is generally disfavored.99 Judicial review to de-
termine whether the jury nullified the law, moreover, is repugnant to 
the principal justifications for jury nullification.100 The Supreme 
95. See text at notes 19-30 supra. 
96. It is suspected that juries acquit against the evidence with greater frequency in certain 
cases - when a defendant is charged with offenses such as gambling, drunken driving, draft 
evasion, or withholding confidential sources. See M. KADISH & S. KADISH, supra note 15, at 
55; H. KAI.VEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 293 (1966); Schellin & Van Dyke, supra 
note 76, at 71-73; Westen & Drube!, supra note 54, at 130 n.230. 
97. There are two basic sources of jury sympathy. First, the defendant himself, by virtue 
of his personal traits, his occupation, or his court appearance, may present a sympathetic pic-
ture. In their study of the jury, Kalven and Zeisel provide numerous examples of this type of 
defendant. See H. KAI.VEN & H. ZEISEL,supra note 96, at 200-09 (describing defendants who 
are crippled, ill, old, veterans, police, clergymen, repentant, attractive in court). Second, the 
jury may perceive that the circumstances surrounding the defendant's case justify acquittal. 
For example, the jury niay believe that "extra-legal punishment" such as job loss sufficiently 
punishes the defendanL See id. at 306-07. Or the jurors may acquit because the defendant 
was subjected to improper police conduct. See id. at 318-23. 
98. See Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. SI, 81, 83, 87, 94-95 (1895); Westen, 
supra note 2, at 1013 n.44. 
99. See Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 394 (1932); United States v. Dougherty, 473 
F.2d lll3, 1120-37 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
100. A jury of "peers" provides a check against the government's potential to abuse its 
power; the government includes ''the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge." Duncan v. Loui-
siana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). Also, the jurors, as laymen, can interpose their "common 
sense judgement through jury nullification." Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970). 
Judicial review cuts against these reasons for jury nullification. It would supplant the jury's 
checking function and permit judges to displace the jury's common sense decision. 
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Court has contrasted the jury's reaction to the "perhaps less sympa-
thetic reaction of the single judge"; 101 to permit the judge to review 
criminal jury verdicts undermines the jury's prerogative to acquit 
against the evidence. 
Since reviewing courts cannot determine when a state jury actu-
ally acquitted against the evidence, they cannot limit double jeop-
ardy protection to identifiable cases of nullification. To ensure that 
the defendant's constitutional interests are adequately protected, 
therefore, the court should begin its analysis with the assumption 
that the acquitting jury nullified the law. It should then apply a 
same offense test that both protects the integrity of the jury's acquit-
tal and recognizes legitimate federal interests in reprosecution. 
The need to balance these interests is well served by the distinct 
elements test promulgated by the Supreme Court in Blockburger v. 
United States. 102 The Blockburger Court held that two offenses are 
not identical if each requires proof of a fact that the other does 
not. 103 If, for example, a defendant is charged with violating two 
statutes, the first requiring proof of elements A, B, and C, and the 
second requiring proof of elements B, C, and D, the Blockburger 
test would permit successive trials on these offenses because each in-
cludes a "distinct" element. Blockburger was a multiple punishment 
case, which required the Court to evaluate the difference in offenses 
at a single trial, 104 but courts have since applied its distinct elements 
IOI. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). 
102. 284 U.S. 299 (1932). When the Supreme Court adopted the distinct elements test in 
.Blockburger, the defendant had been convicted both for selling narcotics not in an original 
stamped package and for selling narcotics without receiving a written order from the pur-
chaser. The lower court then sentenced the defendant to five years in prison for each of these 
offenses, to be served consecutively. Because each offense was based on one sale of narcotics, 
the defendant claimed that he was being twice punished for "the same offense". Using the 
distinct elements test, the Court held that these two offenses were not the same. 284 U.S. at 
304. Ironically, Justice Sutherland, writing for the .Blockburger Court, did 'not mention the 
double jeopardy clause even once. But since the test was taken from an earlier double jeop-
ardy case, Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (191 I), the Court has since applied the 
distinct elements test in double jeopardy cases. See, e.g., Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980); 
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977). See also King v. United States, 565 F.2d 356 (5th 
Cir. 1978) (per curiam); United States v. Hairrell, 521 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1975). For commen-
tators who suggest that the distinct elements test is the test currently employed, see Haddad & 
Mulock, JJouble Jeopardy Problems in the JJefinition of the Same Offense.· State JJiscretion to 
Invoke the Criminal Process Twice, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 515 (1970); Note, The JJouble Jeopardy 
Clause as a .Bar to Reintroducing Evidence, 89 YALE L. J. 962, 966 (1980). 
103. 284 U.S. at 304. 
104. 284 U.S. at 300-01. The federal courts apply the .Blockburger test to determine what 
constitutes consecutive sentences at a single trial. See Albemaz v. United States, 101 S. Ct 
1137, 1141-43 (1981) (21 U.S.C. § 963 conspiracy to import marijuana distinct from 21 U.S.C. 
§ 846 conspiracy to distribute marijuana); United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339, 349 (5th Cir. 
1981) (18 U.S.C. § 1341 mail fraud different from 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) racketeering); United 
States v. Walker, 653 F.2d 1343, 1351 (9th Cir. 1981) (Sherman Act§ 1 conspiracy different 
from 18 U.S.C. § 371 fraud conspiracy), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1982); 
United States v. Greschner, 647 F.2d 740, 744 (7th Cir. 1981) (18 U.S.C. § 113(f) assault differ-
ent from 18 U.S.C. § 1792 conveying a weapon); United States v. Barton, 647 F.2d 224, 235-36 
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test in cases involving retrial within a single jurisdiction.105 That test, 
this Note argues, is also suitable for defining "the same offence" 
when the federal government reprosecutes a defendant following 
state jury acquittal. 106 
Admittedly, the essentially arbitrary B/ockburger test does not 
perfectly resolve double jeopardy issues. Consider, for example, the 
two offenses whose elements are listed above. The B/ockburger test 
permits successive trials because each requires proof of a fact that 
the other does not. But these different proof requirements may pro-
vide little justification for reprosecuting the defendant. When a leg-
islature drafts a criminal statute, it may include certain elements in a 
particular offense not for substantive reasons but for convenience in 
drafting. Indeed, many federal criminal offenses include federal ju-
(2d Cir. 1981) (18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) racketeering conspiracy distinct from 18 U.S.C. § 371 gen-
eral conspiracy statute); United States v. Bangert, 645 F.2d 1297, 1307 (8th Cir. 1981) ("the 
material elements" of 18 U.S.C. § 641 stealing property differ from 18 U.S.C. § 1361 destroy-
ing property), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 314 (Oct. 5, 1981); United States v. Fountain, 642 F.2d 
1083, 1094-95 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2335 (1981). 
105. See Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980) (holding that failure to reduce speed is the 
"same" as manslaughter); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, "166 (1977) (holding that joyriding is 
the "same" as the lesser included offense of car theft); United States v. Ross, 654 F.2d 612, 614 
(9th Cir. 1981) (attempted extortion different from both attempted bank robbery and conspir-
acy to commit bank robbery); Wilkett v. United States, 655 F.2d 1007, 1013-14 (10th Cir. 
1981); King v. United States, 565 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1978) {per curiam); United States v. Hair-
rell, 521 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1975). See also Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 463 (1970) (Bur-
ger, CJ., dissenting) (citing Blockhurger: "This Court, like most American jurisdictions, has 
expanded that part of the Constitution [the double jeopardy clause] into a 'same evidence' 
test"). 
For the purpose of reprosecution within a single jurisdiction, some federal courts caution 
against applying the Blockburger test restrictively. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 n.6 
(1977). In Jordan v. Virginia, 653 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1980), the Fourth Circuit ruled that 
the double jeopardy clause barred prosecution for the felony offense of possessing narcotics 
after conviction of the misdemeanor offense of obtaining those same narcotics. The court re-
fused to apply Blockburger, instead relying on "the more appropriate test for successive prose-
cution." 653 F.2d at 873. In essence, that more appropriate test bars retrial if the second 
offense does not require proof of a "significant additional fact." 653 F.2d at 874 (quoting 
United States v. Sabella, 272 F.2d 206, 212 (2d Cir. 1959)). Put another way, the critical ques-
tion is whether the evidence required for one offense would have sufficed to convict on the 
other. See In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 188 (1889) (quoting Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 
Mass. 433, 434 (1871)). In United Stales v. Sabella, Judge Friendly said that the B/ockburger 
test was developed to determine what offenses can give rise to consecutive sentences and that 
that test was not applicable to successive trials. 272 F.2d at 211-12. See Abbate v. United 
States, 359 U.S. 187, 196-201 (1959) (Brennan, J.). However, Judge Friendly later suggested: 
"Although stated in the context of the prohibition of consecutive sentences after a single trial, 
this [Blockburger] test, has become the established test for double jeopardy [successive trials] as 
well." Archerv. Commissioner of Correction, 646 F.2d 44, 47 n.2 (2d Cir. 1981). In any event, 
courts need not apply the Blockburger test in a highly mechanical fashion. 
In Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977), the Court said that "[i]f two offenses are the 
same under this test for purposes of barring consecutive sentences at a single trial, they neces-
sarily will be the same for purposes of barring successive prosecutions." By implit!ltion, this 
leaves open the possibility that offenses considered different at a single trial may be the same 
for successive prosecutions. See Jordan v. Virginia, ~53 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1980). 
106. For an alternative justification for the Blockburger test in cases involving successive 
state-federal prosecutions, see Stanford Note, supra note 13. 
April 1982) Note - /Jouble Jeopardy and Federal Prosecution 1093 
risdiction as an element.107 A more adequate same offense standard 
would take account of the importance of the proof requirements that 
distinguish the two statutes. Nonetheless, Blockburger provides a 
workable standard for balancing federal interests with the defen-
dant's interests, provided that federal jurisdiction is not the only dis-
tinct element in the federal offense. 
By focusing on the differences between the elements of the first 
and second offenses, the Blockburger test safeguards a defendant's 
interest in jury nullification. When a jury acquits against the evi-
dence, it presumably understands that the defendant is in fact guilty 
of the offense charged. But the jurors decide to acquit the defendant 
because they sympathize with his predicament. If confronted with a 
different offense, however, the jury may not have voted to acquit the 
defendant against the evidence. The distinct elements test attempts 
to determine when two offenses are "sufficiently different" 108 that 
prosecution for the second will not undermine a previous jury's nul-
lification of the first. 
It may be helpful to view reprosecution and the effect of the dis-
tinct elements test from the perspectiv~ of the acquitting jury. When 
the elements required to prove both the state and federal offenses are 
identical, the jury would presumably nullify the second offense as 
well as the first since the factors that originally persuaded it to acquit 
against the evidence would still be present.109 Reprosecution in such 
a case would override the first jury's prerogative to acquit against the 
evidence. When the federal offense contains an additional element, 
107. See generally Pauley, An Analysis of Some Aspects of Jurisdiction under S.1437, the 
Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 47 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 475 (1979). 
108. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 n.6 (1977). 
109. An empirical study conducted by Kalven and Zeisel has disclosed the significance of 
the composition of criminal offenses to jury nullification. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra 
note 96, at 11 l. Kalven and Zeisel found that jurors acquitted where judges would have con-
victed in 16% of the 3576 cases in their sample. They collected data on the reasons for judge-
jury disagreement in 962 of these cases, and they measured the frequency of five reasons for 
disagreement (a) sentiments on the law; (b) sentiments on the defendant; (c) evidence factors; 
(d) facts that only the judge knew; and (e) disparity of counsel. See id Sentiments on the law 
and evidence factors ranked highest, with sentiments on the law a factor in 53% of the cases 
and evidence factors relevant in 78%. See id Conceivably, these two factors bear a strong 
relationship to the composition of the criminal offense. Sentiments on the law, for example, 
may come into play where the jury perceives that "a particular set of facts" is "inappropriately 
classified." See id at 108. Evidence factors become a reason for judge-jury disagreement 
where the jury evaluates "specific items of evidence differently'' than does the judge. See id at 
106. 
To be sure, sentiment for the defendant plays an important role injury nullification. Jury 
sentiment on the defendant, however, is significant when combined with other reasons for 
judge-jury disagreement. While sentiment on the defendant appeared as the sole factor only 
8% of the time in Kalven and Zeisel's sample, it appeared with other reasons in 92% of the 
cases documented. See id at 113. According to the authors, the jury ''yields to sentiment in 
the apparent process of resolving doubts as to evidence." See id at 165. This suggests that the 
jury will be restrained from applying its sentimental views to the extent that the evidence and 
law present a stronger case against the defendant. 
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the jury's basis for nullification is tempered by a factor that it never 
considered. 110 While the state jury might not have acquitted against 
the evidence if it had weighed the federal interest, all of the factors 
originally favoring nullification are still present. Courts should, 
therefore, continue to assume that the first jury would also have nul-
lified the second offense. But when a federal element is added and at 
least one state element is removed from the jury's consideration, a 
court cannot be certain that the factors that compelled the jury to 
acquit against the evidence on the first offense are present in the sec-
ond. At this point, the likelihood that the first jury would nullify the 
second offense has been substantially reduced, and a federal prose-
cution would be permitted under the B/ockburger test. 
CONCLUSION 
The solution to the double jeopardy problem posed by successive 
state-federal prosecutions must take the form of a same offense stan-
dard. When the state trial ended in conviction, the dual sovereignty 
principle, which holds that offenses defined by different governments 
are never "the same," always permits federal reprosecution. An ex-
amination of the values underlying the double jeopardy clause 
reveals, however, that applying the dual sovereignty ,principle after 
state jury acquittals would, in some cases, deprive defendants of 
rights guaranteed by the fifth and sixth amendments. This Note's 
same offense standard, a slightly modified version of the Supreme 
Court's B/ockburger test, accommodates the federal interest in prose-
cution and the acquitted defendant's heightened double jeopardy in-
terests. By converting what could be a difficult balancing process 
into a comparison of the elements of the state and federal offenses, 
this test provides a workable solution to a difficult double jeopardy 
problem. 
ll0. Typically, this extra element protects national interests in areas such as civil rights, 
see 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976); S. REP. No. 721, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in (1968] U.S. 
CooE CONG. & AD. NEws 1837, 1840, ensuring the safety of federal officers, see 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1751 (1976), or protecting the mails, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1737 (1976). See generally Ruff, 
Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case Study in the Making of Low E'!forcement Pol-
icy, 65 GEO. LJ. ll71, 1209 (1977). Distinct national interests may be identifiable in some 
cases well-suited for federal enforcement because the states appear unable to prosecute effec-
tively, as in racketeering. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951-1968 (1976). 
